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ABSTRACT
As the United States becomes increasingly dependent
on universal, high-speed wireless services, infrastructural
limitations are producing tension. The interests of
consumers, telecommunications companies, state and local
authorities, and businesses, as well as national security,
are all at stake. Yet legal uncertainty stemming from a split
among federal circuit courts hampers the development of
solutions. The courts diverge on the interpretation of a key
provision of the Telecommunications Act (TCA), 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(7)(B), that regulates wireless service providers’
ability to erect new towers. There is great need for a
national standard to give mobile providers a uniform
means of accommodating growing demand. Without such a
standard, courts apply the TCA incongruently, affecting
consumers and providers alike and ultimately impacting
critical infrastructure. The Federal Communications
Commission or Congress should set a uniform standard,
rather than relying on the courts to confront the issue
unevenly on a case-by-case basis.
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INTRODUCTION
Today’s mobile phones are revolutionizing the way we live:
from our phones we can summon street views of towns across the
globe, turn off the lights in our homes while sitting in an airport
lounge, or broadcast a television show from the previous night
while commuting by train. The advanced data-transmitting
technology that powers this revolution depends on the availability
of massive bands of radiofrequency waves, collectively referred to
as “spectrum,” for its survival.
Demand for data is rapidly increasing. Approximately 88% of
adults in the United States—some 315.5 million people—subscribe
to mobile services. 1 As of 2011, nearly one-third of U.S.
households use mobile phones instead of landlines for voice
access. 2 Moreover, approximately 17% of mobile phone users rely
1

Lee Rainie, The State of Mobile Connectivity, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE
PROJECT (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/
Presentations/2012/Aug/The-State-of-Mobile-Connectivity.aspx.
2
Stephen J. Blumberg & Julian V. Luke, Wireless Substitution: Early
Release of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, January–June
2011, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS AT THE CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/
wireless201112.pdf.
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on their phones for primary access to the Internet. 3 "Annual
investment in U.S. wireless services grew more than 40% between
2009 and 2012, to $30 billion from $21 billion, and is projected to
rise to $35 billion in 2013." 4
Towers communicate with wireless devices through
radiofrequency waves. 5 Radiofrequency spectrum, as regulated, is
a finite resource, and it has become increasingly scarce. 6 The
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) estimates that
demand for spectrum will soon be greater than supply. 7 The FCC
is actively working to solve this dilemma, recently issuing a notice
of proposed rulemaking that would provide greater spectrum to
3

Aaron Smith, Cell Internet Use, PEW INTERNET AND AM. LIFE PROJECT
(June 26, 2012), available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Cell-InternetUse-2012.aspx.
4
Office of the Press Sec'y, Exec. Office of the President, Fact Sheet:
Administration Provides Another Boost to Wireless Broadband and
Technological
Innovation,
(June
14,
2013),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/spectrum_fact_sheet_final.pdf
(determining that the U.S. wireless broadband industry contributes more than
$150 billion in GDP annually).
5
Office of the Press Sec'y, Exec. Office of the President. Fact Sheet:
Doubling the Amount of Commercial Spectrum to Unleash the Innovative
Potential of Wireless Broadband (Jun. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-doubling-amountcommercial-spectrum-unleash-innovative-potential-wireles.
6
Id. (“As the revolution in mobile broadband and related technologies
unfolds, the demand for spectrum will continue to increase—leading to
increasing fears of a “spectrum crunch” . . . Mobile broadband technologies
enable consumers and businesses to access unprecedented amounts of voice,
data, and video applications through wireless networks. Demand for commercial
wireless data services that are secure and reliable is expected to increase
exponentially in the next decade as new services and technologies develop.”).
7
See Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Federal Commc’n Comm’n,
Speaking at International Consumer Electronics Association (Jan. 9, 2013) (“We
predict a WiFi traffic jam and we need to fix it . . . WiFi is such an integral part
of our broadband ecosystem, that we need to make sure we pay it sufficient
attention."), available at http://www.wirelessweek.com/news/2013/01/fccmove-better-wi-fi; Randall Stephenson, Op-Ed., Spectrum and the Wireless
Revolution, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2012, at A3 (“If [excess demand] happens, the
speed of the mobile revolution will slow down. Prices, download times and
consumer frustration will all increase. And at a societal level we risk
jeopardizing the future of our nation’s vital mobile Internet infrastructure, which
is generating jobs and investment . . . .”).
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unlicensed devices, including smartphones, tablets, and similar
personal wireless devices. 8 Additionally, President Barack Obama
issued a memorandum encouraging agencies that have previously
utilized spectrum for federal use to implement policies where they
share access with commercial companies. 9
While the availability of spectrum is a critical and wellrecognized component of mobile wireless broadband, 10 the
proximity of towers to customers is also essential to the provision
of quality service. 11 Yet local communities are reluctant to allow
more towers in their neighborhoods. Consequently, local and state
governments are squeezed to make these critical infrastructure
decisions. 12
Tension is building as demand grows for reliable, fast, and
ubiquitous service, and mobile providers are vying to meet this
demand before their competitors. Telecommunications companies’
key to market competitiveness is provision of coast-to-coast
8

Press Release, Federal Commc’n Comm’n, Statement of FCC Chairman
Julius Genachowski on Incentive Auction Proposal (Sept. 7, 2012), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0907/DOC316148A1.pdf (“In freeing up spectrum for wireless broadband, incentive
auctions will drive faster speeds, greater capacity, and ubiquitous mobile
coverage. These are essential ingredients for innovation and leadership in the
21st century economy where smartphones and tablets powered by 4G LTE and
Wi-Fi networks are proliferating, and the mobile Internet becomes more
important every day. Over the last few years, the U.S. has regained global
leadership in mobile innovation -- and we must not let up now."); see also Press
Release, Federal Commc’n Comm’n, Increased Spectrum Available for
Unlicensed Devices in the 5 GHz Band (Feb. 20, 2013), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/document/increased-spectrum-available-unlicensed-devices5-ghz-band.
9
Expanding America's Leadership in Wireless Innovation, 78 Fed. Reg.
37,431 (June 14, 2013) (advocating for eliminating sharing restrictions between
commercial carriers and federal agencies).
10
National Broadband Plan, Executive Summary, Federal Commc’n
Comm’n, available at http://www.broadband.gov/plan/executive-summary/ (last
visited Oct. 20, 2013).
11
Types of Broadband Connections, Federal Commc’n Comm’n, available
at http://www.broadband.gov/broadband_types.html#wireless (last visited Oct.
20, 2013).
12
See Gregory Tan, Wading Through the Rhetoric of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Uncertainty of Local Zoning Authority over
Wireless Telecommunications Tower Siting, 22 VT. L. REV. 461, 461 (1997).

2013]

CAN YOU HEAR ME NOW?

119

nationwide coverage, reaching even the most rural regions, at the
highest speeds available. 13
However, telecommunications
companies looking to build new towers or devices to create or
improve such a nationwide network are governed, and in some
cases thwarted, by the regulations stipulated in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA). 14
The TCA preserves local authority over the location and
construction of wireless communication facilities, with certain
exceptions. Section 332(c)(7)(B) provides that a state or local
government shall not “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the
provision of personal wireless services” by “regulation of the
placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless
services.” 15 A circuit split has developed as courts have decided
which types of government actions are appropriately labeled
“effective prohibition.” 16
First, courts are split over whether the denial of one provider’s
application to erect a new tower constitutes effective prohibition
under the TCA. 17 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in AT&T
Wireless PCS v. City Council of Virginia Beach read the statute to
mean that only blanket bans or general bans that affect all
13

See, e.g., Theresa Howard, ‘Can you hear me now?’ a Hit, USA TODAY
(Feb. 23, 2004, 8:14 A.M.), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money
/advertising/adtrack/2004-02-22-track-verizon_x.htm (explaining that
network reliability grew to become a customer priority and that Verizon’s
marketing campaign showing Verizon workers in the middle of wheat fields and
snowy mountains receiving strong cellular signal helped Verizon increase its net
customers by 10% in the first two years of its campaign).
14
47 U.S.C. § 332 (2006).
15
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B).
16
Compare AT&T Wireless PCS v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155
F.3d 423, 428 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that only blanket bans or general
prohibitions on all providers constitute effective prohibition) with Second
Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 627 (1st Cir. 2002)
(explaining that if a local government’s decision to restrict one wireless
provider’s access to build or modify a wireless communication facility, that in
consequence, effectively prohibits wireless services, and then the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution requires that the local government’s authority be
preempted by the TCA’s policy goals).
17
See T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Charter Twp. of West Bloomfield, 691 F.3d
794, 797 (6th Cir. 2012); Metro PCS v. City & Cnty of San Francisco, 400
F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2005); AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d 423.
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providers qualify as effective prohibition. 18 On the other hand, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Metro PCS v. City & County of
San Francisco and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in T-Mobile
Central, LLC v. Charter Township of West Bloomfield rejected the
Fourth Circuit’s narrow reading and held that denial of a single
provider’s application violates the TCA. 19
Most courts have expanded their analysis of effective
prohibition beyond the question of whether there is a ban on all
providers, focusing their analyses on individual wireless providers.
In doing so, the courts have established a two-pronged test to
determine whether the denial of a company’s application
constitutes an effective prohibition, asking (1) whether there is a
significant gap in coverage, and (2) whether filling that gap is
necessary and all other options have been thoroughly exhausted. 20
Courts have considered whether a state or local government can
still violate the TCA in the absence of a general prohibition by
preventing a wireless provider from closing a significant gap in
coverage. However, courts vary on the interpretation of the term
“significant gap,” disagreeing on whether it refers to one
provider’s coverage, or all available coverage.
The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits have adopted the “oneprovider rule,” under which there is not a significant gap in a
particular area if at least one provider serves that area. 21
Conversely, the First Circuit, in Second Generation Props., L.P. v.
Town of Pelham, and the Ninth Circuit, in MetroPCS, both rejected
the one-provider rule and adopted a multiple-provider rule that
evaluates each provider independently to determine whether each
has a coverage gap in the area. 22 In 2009, the FCC weighed in on
18

See AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 428.
See T-Mobile, 691 F.3d at 803; Metro PCS, 400 F.3d at 730.
20
See MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 731; see also T-Mobile, 691 F.3d at 804; see
generally Robert B. Foster, The Better Part of Valor is Co-Location: Recent
Developments in Judicial Review of Land Use Regulation of Cellular
Telecommunications Facilities under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 42
URB. LAW. 595, 595 (2010).
21
See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643 (2d Cir. 1999);
APT Pittsburgh LTD v. Penn Twp. Butler Cnty of Pa., 196 F.3d 469, 478 (3d
Cir. 1999); AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 428.
22
See Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620,
634 (1st Cir. 2002); MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 733.
19

2013]

CAN YOU HEAR ME NOW?

121

this issue, adopting the latter approach. 23 In August 2012, the Sixth
Circuit, in T-Mobile Central, joined the latter camp. 24
Once the court determines that there is a significant gap, the
second prong of the test requires that providers demonstrate both
the need to close the gap and evidence that there is no other
feasible location to erect the facility. Again, the circuits have
interpreted this provision differently. The Second, Third, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits have adopted a standard that requires the
provider to demonstrate that the proposed means for closing the
gap—most commonly, a new wireless tower—is the “least
intrusive” means; that is, the provider must show that it has
considered other locations, system designs, and tower designs. 25
The First and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, require simply
that the provider show there are no other viable alternatives. 26
As a result of these divisions, telecommunications companies’
market access and ability to expand infrastructure is greater in
some circuits than in others. This creates a quandary for wireless
providers seeking to meet increasing mobile data demand, which
affects not only consumers but even national security. 27 As
President Obama has argued, high-speed wireless access is
essential to developing a technologically advanced twenty-first
century society that is connected at all times. 28 As we become so
23

See In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Section
332(c)(7)(B), 24 F.C.C.R. 13994, ¶ 57 (2009).
24
See T-Mobile, 691 F.3d at 804.
25
See id. at 808; Metro PCS, 400 F.3d at 734; Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643;
Penn Twp., 196 F.3d at 480.
26
See VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix Cnty, 342 F.3d 818, 834–
5 (7th Cir. 2003); Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 635.
27
See generally Steven J. Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications,
Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 446
(2005).
28
President Barack Obama, Opening Remarks at the White House Rural
Economic Forum (Aug. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2011/08/16/opening-remarks-president-white-house-ruraleconomic-forum (“[J]ust as the interstate highways knitted the country together
50 years ago, we’ve also got to do some new things to meet the challenges of the
21st century. We need to expand the reach of broadband, high-speed Internet, to
7 million more people and hundreds of thousands of businesses in rural
communities . . . It’s helping people sell goods, not just down the street but
across the country and around the world.”).
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intensely dependent on wireless infrastructure, 29 an inconsistent
and ambiguous approach does not further the best interests of the
United States or its people.
This Article will first outline the applicable TCA provision and
its legislative history, as well as FCC orders to discern
Congressional intent in drafting the TCA. Next, the Article will
analyze the TCA in light of the circuit splits to find the source of
the conflicting holdings and the ways in which courts have
interpreted the TCA provision. Finally, this Article will explore the
stakes of the circuit split and the myriad ways the split is impacting
the United States, its citizens, and its telecommunications
providers.
I.

THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
A. The Act

In 1996, President William J. Clinton signed the TCA,30
celebrating the monumental event as exemplary of his “promise to
reform our telecommunications laws in a manner that leads to
competition and private investment, promotes universal service
and open access to information networks, and provides for flexible
government regulation.” 31
Section 704(c)(7) of the TCA, 32 entitled “Preservation of local
zoning authority,” added a new provision to section 332 of the
29

Critical Infrastructure Protection, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347 (July 17, 1996)
(emphasizing that “[c]ertain national infrastructures are so vital that their
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or
economic security of the United States. These critical infrastructures include
telecommunications . . . .”).
30
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996), codified 47 U.S.C. § 332.
31
President’s Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(February 8, 1996), reprinted in 3 Federal Telecommunications Law: A
Legislative History of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, doc. 95, at 208
(B.D. Reams, Jr. & W.H Man zeds., 1997) (“The Telecommunications Act of
1996 will strengthen our economy, our society, our families, and our democracy.
It promotes competition as the key to opening new markets and new
opportunities. It will protect consumers by regulating the remaining monopolies
for a time and by providing a roadmap for deregulation in the future.”).
32
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7).
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Communications Act of 1984. It provided that local or state
government must not interfere with “the placement, construction,
and modification of personal wireless services” and any regulation
cannot “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting” such services. 33
This language maintained local governments’ decision-making
authority, except where decisions pertain to “the placement,
construction, and modification of personal wireless service
facilities.” 34 It also created new limitations by placing a
substantive restriction on state and local decisions such that they
may not effectively prohibit personal wireless services. 35 Finally,
the amendment provided for judicial review of decisions—any
person adversely affected by state or local authorities may bring
action in federal or state court. 36
As the following sections will explore, the ambiguity of this
substantive limitation has produced considerable discord among
the courts. While the FCC has presumed authority to resolve one
aspect of the issue—how to define effective prohibition—the
agency has not clarified the application of the provision in its
entirety, giving the courts leeway, but also an obligation, to create
and apply their own standards and tests.
B. The Legislative History
In enacting the TCA, Congress sought to provide “a procompetitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to
rapidly accelerate private sector deployment of advanced
telecommunications and information technologies and services to
all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to
competition.” 37 Policy objectives underlying the TCA included
both reducing regulation to increase competition—incentivizing
33

Id.; see also THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 LAW AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 58 (Robert E. Emeritz et al. eds., 1996) (concluding that
state and local governments are limited in their authority to regulate because
they cannot unreasonably discriminate and cannot, explicitly or implicitly,
effectively prohibit wireless services).
34
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A).
35
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
36
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
37
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996) reprinted in 1996 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 10, 1124.
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lower prices and higher quality services 38—and preserving local
authority to govern and regulate. 39 These two policy goals are in an
enduring tension under the current framework, laying the
foundation for dissonant interpretations among the courts. 40
However, the legislative history unambiguously shows that
Congress intended the effective prohibition provision to be
assessed on a case-by-case basis, not to establish a general, blanket
rule. 41 The FCC issued a ruling in 2009 interpreting the plain
language of the TCA as following the multiple-provider rule, and
determining that any other interpretation would be in violation of
the TCA’s pro-competitive purpose. 42 The agency submitted that
its interpretation aligned with the basic goals of the TCA—“to
improve service quality and lower prices for consumers.” 43 But the
difficulty did not end there. Once this issue was resolved, the
courts created a two-pronged test to further determine when a
provider’s application could be denied. Courts have interpreted this
test in varying ways.

38

S. Rep. No. 104-23, Purpose of the Bill (1995), reprinted in 1 Federal
Telecommunications Law, at 1; H.R. Rep. No. 104-204, Purpose and Summary
(1995), reprinted in 1 Federal Telecommunications Law, at 47–50.
39
See S.652 CRS Summary H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996).
40
See ATC Realty v. Town of Kingston, 303 F.3d 91, 94 (1st Cir. 2002)
(explaining that the TCA “works like a scale that, inter alia, attempts to balance
two objects of competing weight: on one arm sits the need to accelerate the
deployment of telecommunications technology, while on the other arm rests the
desire to preserve state and local control over zoning matters.”).
41
See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 202, 222 (“Actions taken by State or local governments
shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the placement, construction or
modification of personal wireless services. It is the intent of this section that
bans or policies that have the effect of banning personal wireless services or
facilities not be allowed and that decisions be made on a case-by-case basis.”);
see also President’s Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(February 8, 1996), reprinted in 3 Federal Telecommunications Law: A
Legislative History of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, doc. 95, at 208
(B.D. Reams, Jr. & W.H Man zeds., 1997) (emphasizing that the TCA was
created to promote and protect universal wireless services competition).
42
In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Section
332(c)(7)(B), 24 F.C.C.R. 13994, ¶ 58–61 (2009).
43
Id.
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THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Since 1996, various wireless providers have brought
actions challenging local authority to deny their applications for
new wireless facilities. In deciding these cases, courts have looked
to the TCA’s underlying policies. 44 Essentially, the courts have
had to determine how broadly Congress intended to preempt state
and local authority. 45 That is, they have had to determine whether
denying a service provider’s application to place, construct, or
modify a tower violates § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) of the TCA 46 by
effectively prohibiting personal wireless services, and whether
Congress intended this provision to be applied on a case-by-case
basis or to create a general prohibition. This has taken the form of
a two-pronged test to determine whether the denial of a company’s
application constitutes an effective prohibition: first, there must be
a “significant gap” in coverage; and second, the proposed plan to
address that gap must be necessary to achieve the desired
coverage. 47

44

Robert B. Foster, The Better Part of Valor is Co-Location: Recent
Developments in Judicial Review of Land Use Regulation of Cellular
Telecommunications Facilities under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 42
URB. LAW. 595, 595 (Summer 2010) (“[C]ourts have worked to harmonize
Congress’s ‘two sometimes contradictory purposes’ in enacting the Act: to
promote competition and reduce regulation in order to accelerate the deployment
of telecommunications technology while also preserving state and local control
over land use matters.”).
45
See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of Virginia Beach,
979 F.Supp. 416, 426 (E.D. Va. 1997) aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d
423 (4th Cir. 1998).
46
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
47
See MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 731; see also T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Charter
Tp. of West Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 806 (6th Cir. 2012). See generally Robert
B. Foster, The Better Part of Valor is Co-Location: Recent Developments in
Judicial Review of Land Use Regulation of Cellular Telecommunications
Facilities under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 42 URB. LAW. 595, 595
(2010).
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A. Showing a “Significant Gap” in Coverage
The first portion of the analysis concerns whether there is a
significant gap in coverage in the area. Because the TCA does not
define “significant gap,” the courts have wrestled with its
meaning. 48 Two distinct judicial standards have emerged for
evaluating coverage gaps in the context of effective prohibition:
the “one-provider rule” and the “multiple-provider rule.”
1. The “One-Provider Rule”
Under the one-provider rule, if at least one company provides
coverage for an area, there is no significant gap in coverage and a
state or local government may preclude other companies from
providing coverage in that area. 49 In AT&T, the City Council of
Virginia Beach denied AT&T’s application to construct two new
towers on a church in a wooded area where signals were weak. 50
The district court evaluated legislative history and determined that
the TCA provision grants local governments the authority to
decline applications even if doing so excludes competitors. 51 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit looked to the plain meaning of the

48

See, e.g., Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d
620, 631 (1st Cir. 2002) (distinguishing between a geographic gap that is not
served by any carrier and a dead spot that is statutorily permissible because even
reliable coverage will have areas of weakness, and acknowledging that parties
are using the definition of significant gap to address a “qualitatively different
and much more complex set of problems”); see also 360 degrees
Communications Co. of Charlottesville v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Albemarle County,
211 F.3d 79, 87 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding the varying definitions of “significant
gap” divined by various circuit courts are unhelpful in determining whether the
TCA has been violated).
49
See MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 731 (barring other violations, e.g., of zoning
laws and of other provisions of the TCA).
50
AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of City of Virginia Beach, 979
F.Supp. 416, 420 (E.D. Va. 1997).
51
Id. at 426 (granting the City Council summary judgment because
Congress only intended to prohibit general bans and AT&T failed to
demonstrate that denial of its application was a general ban) (citing H.R. Conf.
Rep. No 104-458, 104th Conf., 2d Sess. 208 (1996), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 124,
222).
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phrase “significant gap” and arrived at the same conclusion. 52 The
Fourth Circuit was joined by the Second and Third circuits in
adopting the one-provider rule. 53 Some courts reasoned that the
one-provider rule promotes the regulatory efforts of the TCA to
establish nationwide cellular coverage. 54
2. The “Multiple-Provider Rule”
The First Circuit, in Second Generation; the Ninth Circuit, in
MetroPCS; and the Sixth Circuit, in T-Mobile Central, rejected a
narrow reading of the TCA and held that a state or local
government that denies one provider’s application effectively
prohibits personal wireless services generally. 55
In Second Generation, the provider planned to build a tower on
52

AT&T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 424 (recognizing that even without
beginning with a legislative history statutory analysis as the lower court did, the
statute clearly reads that blanket bans on all providers constitute effective
prohibition and such a reading follows the TCA’s goal of promoting
competition).
53
See Omnipoint Commc’n Enter., L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Easttown
Twp., 331 F.3d 386, 398 (3d Cir. 2003); Nextel W. Corp. v. Unity Twp., 282
F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2002) (requiring that for a provider to demonstrate a
significant gap, the gap must be “from a user's perspective, rather than a
particular provider's perspective”); Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d
630, 640-1 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[c]onstruing subsection B(i)(II) to apply only to
general bans would lead to the conclusion that in the absence of an explicit antitower policy, a court would have to wait for a series of denied applications
before it could step in and force a local government to end its illegal boycott of
personal wireless services”); APT Pittsburgh LTD v. Penn Twp. Butler Cnty of
Pa., 196 F.3d 469, 478 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Interpreting the TCA’s ‘effect of
prohibiting’ clause to encompass every individual zoning denial simply because
it has the effect of precluding a specific provider from providing wireless
services, however, would give the TCA preemptive effect well beyond what
Congress intended.”).
54
See Omnipoint, 331 F.3d at 400 (reasoning that when one provider enters
an area of service, the provisions of the TCA “work together to promote the
expansion of wireless telcommunications networks”) (citing Unity Township,
282 F.3d at 264 n.6).
55
See T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Charter Twp. Of West Bloomfield, 691 F.3d.
at 808-09; MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 733; Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town
of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 634 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The fact that some carrier
provides some service to some consumers does not in itself mean that the town
has not effectively prohibited services to other consumers.”).
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its ninety acres of land situated atop a heavily wooded area along a
highway in New Hampshire. 56 After the township denied the
Second Generation’s application twice, the company filed suit
alleging that the local authorities were violating the TCA by
effectively prohibiting personal wireless services. 57 Similarly, in
MetroPCS, the San Francisco planning commission denied the
provider’s application to install six panels above a garage to
ameliorate allegedly poor service in the area. 58 The courts in both
cases reasoned that the denial of one application could qualify as
effective prohibition when a significant gap in coverage exists and
alternative solutions to resolving the gap have been exhausted. 59
In MetroPCS, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the language of the
TCA with a more discriminating inquiry. 60 The court determined
that MetroPCS had not sufficiently demonstrated the need for a
new tower. 61 Meanwhile, the T-Mobile court noted that a party
need not show a significant gap in coverage by gathering
complaints from customers, but could instead provide the court
with technical evidence. 62
In Second Generation, the First Circuit reasoned that if a local
law or regulation prevented a wireless provider from resolving a
significant gap in its own service, then it was effectively
prohibiting wireless services. 63 The court argued that a multipleprovider approach serves both the interests of consumers and the
TCA’s underlying regulatory goal “to secure lower prices and
56

Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 624.
Id. at 624–5.
58
MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 718–9.
59
Id. at 731; Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 634.
60
See MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 731 (considering not only whether the TCA
was meant to prohibit general bans, but also whether a locality can violate the
TCA’s “effective prohibition” provision if it denies a wireless provider with the
means for closing a “significant gap” in its own coverage).
61
Id. at 733 (“[T]he record is replete with contradictory allegations as to
MetroPCS’s need for the Geary site.”).
62
T-Mobile, 2012 WL 3570666, at *11 (assessing that “RF propagation
maps and drive test data, along with a report by an RF engineer” are suitable for
providing evidence of a significant gap).
63
Second Generation, 313 F.3d 620, 634 (1st Cir. 2002) (highlighting that
Congress used “services” not “service” in its construction of section
332(c)(7)(B), thus insinuating that Congress considered multiple carriers, not
one carrier, to serve a particular area).
57
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better service for consumers by opening all telecommunications
markets to competition.” 64
Nonetheless, courts in both the one-provider and multipleprovider camps agree that “significant gap” refers to gaps that are
truly significant, 65 and federal regulations confirm this
understanding. 66 In 2009, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling
endorsing the multiple-provider rule and seemingly resolving the
significant gap conflict. 67 However, the split over the second
prong of the test, which requires providers to demonstrate the
necessity and feasibility of alternative locations, remains
unresolved.
B. Showing Necessity
Once a wireless provider successfully demonstrates that a
significant gap exists, the provider must establish the necessity of
closing the particular gap and the degree of intrusiveness of the
64

H.R. Rep. No. 104 204, Purpose and Summary (1995), reprinted in 1
Federal Telecommunications Law, at 47–50 (determining the absence of
effective prohibition from the mere fact that one service provider is in an area
would allow a locality to deny as many providers as it wishes, which fails to
serve the consumer’s interest, and establishes the foundation for not only
sporadic coverage, but also for promoting a one provider industry contrary to the
Act that Congress enacted to promote competition).
65
See MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 733-4 (clarifying that the TCA does not
guarantee wireless providers with the right to cover every city block within a
covered area, making this inquiry fact specific); Sprint Spectrum, L.P., v.
Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643–4 (recognizing that there will inevitably be certain
areas within a building, for example, that will not have service, but because this
lack of service is de minimis, denying a provider from constructing an additional
tower to meet this demand does not constitute effective prohibition).
66
See 47 C.F.R. § 22.99 (2001) (defining areas with significant gaps in
coverage as “[s]mall areas within a service area where the field strength is lower
than the minimum level for reliable service”).
67
See In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Section
332(c)(7)(B), 24 F.C.C.R. 13994, ¶ 56–7 (2009) available at
http://www.ct.gov/csc/lib/csc/fcc/fcc-09-99a1.pdf (“We conclude that State or
local government that denies an application for personal wireless service
facilities citing solely because ‘one or more carriers serve a given geographic
market’ has engaged in unlawful regulation . . . any other interpretation of this
provision would be inconsistent with the Telecommunications Act’s procompetitive purpose . . . .”).
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proposed means. 68 The Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth circuits
have adopted a standard that requires a showing that the proposal
is the “least intrusive” means. 69 The First and Seventh circuits
require instead that the provider show there are no other viable
alternatives to the proposed plan. 70
1. The “Least Intrusive” Standard
In MetroPCS, the Ninth Circuit recognized the competing
methods that other circuits have utilized to determine the requisite
showing. 71 The court reasoned that considering the most
acceptable option would be too subjective, while requiring there be
no other options was unrealistically stringent. 72 Thus, the court
concluded the “least intrusive” standard was best for both the local
ordinances as well as for the providers. 73 Similarly, in T-Mobile
68

See MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 734.
See T-Mobile Cent.,LLC, 691 F.3d at 808; MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 734;
Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643; APT Pittsburgh LTD v. Penn Twp. Butler Cnty of Pa.,
196 F.3d 469, 480 (3d Cir. 1999).
70
See Voicestream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix Cnty, 342 F.3d 818, 834–
5 (7th Cir. 2003); Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d
620, 635 (1st Cir. 2002)
71
MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 734 (finding that “the district court attempted to
reconcile competing interpretations of the intrusiveness inquiry by creating its
own ‘fact-based test that requires the provider to demonstrate that its proposed
solution is the most acceptable option for the community in question’” (citing
MetroPCS, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded sub nom. MetroPCS, Inc. v. City &
County of San Francisco, 400 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2005))). Compare Penn Twp.
196 F.3d at 480 (requiring the provider to show that “the manner in which it
proposes to fill the significant gap in service is the least intrusive on the values
that the denial sought to serve.”), with Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 635
(requiring providers to show there are “no alternative sites which would solve
the problem.”).
72
MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 734 (comparing that the district court’s “most
acceptable option” was counterintuitive because providers would not be able to
overcome this subjective standard, especially when a proposal had already been
denied for that location, while the “only viable option” standard would
ultimately prevent any facility from being built since no one spot would ever be
the “only” option available, thus wasting the time and resources of both wireless
companies and local governments).
73
Id. at 734–5 (positing that the least intrusive standard encourages
providers to select the least intrusive site in their first application, “and it
69

2013]

CAN YOU HEAR ME NOW?

131

the Sixth Circuit adopted the least intrusive standard for its
flexibility, and held that T-Mobile had made the requisite showing
of necessity and alternate options because it made good faith
attempts at identifying alternative locations. 74
2. The “No Viable Alternatives” Standard
In Second Generation, the First Circuit reasoned the provider
failed to meet its burden of showing the significant gap in coverage
could not be resolved by other means because Second Generation
had not yet determined whether other possible solutions were
infeasible. 75 Similarly, in VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St.
Croix County, the Seventh Circuit held that to meet the second
prong of the two-part test, the wireless provider must show “there
are no other potential solutions to the purported problem.” 76 The
court did not find that VoiceStream’s efforts met its heavy burden
to demonstrate that its proposal was “the only feasible plan for
closing the gap” because it did not thoroughly pursue alternative
arrangements. 77
promises to ultimately identify the best solution for the community, not merely
the last one remaining after a series of application denials.”).
74
T-Mobile, 691 F.3d at 808 (explaining that with a “no viable alternatives”
standard, wireless providers could “endlessly have to search for different,
marginally better alternatives,” whereas the least intrusive standard is
“straightforward”) (citing Omnipoint, 331 F.3d at 398 (noting the least intrusive
standard “will require a showing that good faith effort has been made to identify
and evaluate less intrusive alternative system designs, alternative tower designs,
placement of antennae on existing structures, etc.”)).
75
Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 635 (finding Second Generation “failed
to show that a taller tower . . . could not be built in the Overlay Zone to remedy
the alleged gap. Nor did it show that no other feasible sites existed outside of
the Overlay Zone . . . also failed to explore whether existing towers in nearby
jurisdictions . . . could provide other carriers with coverage in the purported
gap.”).
76
VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix Cnty, 342 F.3d 818, 834
(citing Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 629) (concluding that, “so long as the
service provider has not investigated thoroughly the possibility of other viable
alternatives, the denial of an individual permit does not ‘prohibit or have the
effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.’”).
77
Id. at 836 (“Although VoiceStream provided extensive maps, diagrams,
environmental assessments and historic assessments for the Somerset site,
VoiceStream provided no maps, diagrams, or any type of assessment on
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III.

THE STAKES

Each standard puts significantly different burdens on wireless
providers, which has important implications for both consumers
and providers. Wireless companies must provide services
nationwide, as the twenty-first–century society is so mobile. A
standard that varies by circuit, then, ultimately affects coverage
among the circuits’ territory.
Because providers have increased revenue in the mobile market
by meeting this data-driven demand rather than by expanding
traditional voice service, it is paramount that wireless providers
keep up with consumer demands for ubiquitous high-speed
wireless service. 78 The current circuit split serves as an
impediment to consumer access in certain areas of the country,
while also affecting wireless service providers’ potential for
growth.
More generally, the telecommunications sector is a vital organ
of the United States’ infrastructure, critical to national security and
economic growth. 79 For example, after the attacks of September
11, 2001, wireless phones were central to national emergency
planning. 80
The Chairman and CEO of AT&T urged the federal
government to make wireless services a national priority and create
a national model so that providers have a uniform standard to
implement wireless infrastructure. 81 President Obama’s 2013
multiple-tower configurations as alternative sites . . . conclusory statements by
the applicant, without more, are insufficient to establish that the applicant has
exhausted thoroughly the possibility of other viable alternatives.”).
78
See Rushton, supra note 78, (defining 4G as the fourth generation of
mobile services that provides the fastest Internet speeds to date—speeds that are
ten times faster than the previous 3G network).
79
See Eagle, supra note 27, at 446.
80
See Laura H. Phillips & Jason E. Friedrich, Wireless: Can Regulatory
“Business as Usual” Continue?, COMM. LAW., (Fall 2002) at 12 (noting that on
September 11, 2011 wireless phones were instrumental in reestablishing
communication, consequently emphasizing for the government, companies, and
families, the advantages of reliable, ubiquitous wireless coverage).
81
Stephenson, supra note 7, at A3 (“Establish a national model for the
local approval process that’s required when wireless carriers need to build new
mobile infrastructure. The process needs to balance community concerns with
the significant public benefit of adding new antennas and improving wireless
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Budget Plan is premised on building an enduring economy atop a
twenty-first century infrastructure, and this includes extending
next-generation, wireless broadband to all parts of the country. 82
Just as roads and electricity helped build local economies and
businesses decades ago, the ability for communities today to
innovate and compete in the global economy is dependent on
building the country’s wireless infrastructure. 83 Because highspeed wireless access is so widely relied upon, decisions to grant
or deny proposals to construct or modify wireless towers have the
potential for substantial impact. 84
CONCLUSION
In the developed world, where people increasingly depend on
mobile devices to fulfill some of the most mundane tasks,
telecommunications companies are faced with a growing challenge
to meet this demand. Society has a contradictory request: provide
high-speed, ubiquitous coverage at all times, but keep unsightly
and potentially dangerous facilities away. As a result, local
governments often deny providers’ applications to build or modify
facilities because of significant pushback from community
coverage in local markets. Building our nation’s railroads and interstate highway
system was made easier because Congress declared their construction a national
priority and provided the policy framework to build them quickly. Our wireless
infrastructure is every bit as critical to economic expansion.”).
82
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office Of The President, An Economy
Century
Infrastructure
(2013),
Built
to
Last
and
a
21st
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet/an-economy-built-to-last-and-a-21stcentury-infrastructure (last visited March 15, 2013) (stating that high speed,
wireless broadband is a critical element to a growing, innovative economy).
83
Justin Thiltgen, Wireless Broadband the Critical Infrastructure of the 21st
Century, Telegraph Herald, Aug. 21, 2011, at A15, available at
http://www.thonline.com/news/opinion/article_d864cafd-7fde-5383-9d0519708ad8e459.html?mode=image&photo=0 (“Farming is a competitive
industry, just like any other, and farmers and ranchers need to have access to
real-time updates to markets, prices and relevant news. They need to remotely
monitor conditions and even use video for real-time observation. And because
most farmers are out working in the field - not tied to an office - wireless
broadband allows them to stay connected and do business from anywhere on
their property.”).
84
See id.
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members.
Under § 332(c)(7)(B), the TCA allows state or local authorities
to deny a provider’s application to build, modify, or construct a
wireless facility so long as it does not prohibit or have the effect of
prohibiting wireless services. Because of the ambiguous nature of
the provision, the circuits have split on how to interpret and apply
the provision.
The only way to resolve this split is to create a national
standard so all national mobile providers have a uniform means for
approaching the growing demand and local authorities have a
standard to meet when reviewing new applications. Without such a
standard, the TCA is being implemented incongruently, affecting
both consumers and providers, and ultimately affecting the critical
infrastructure that so many Americans rely upon for business,
national security, innovation, and daily convenience. Because
Congress created a relatively ambiguous provision, the courts have
confronted it unevenly on a case-by-case basis. The better solution
would be for Congress or the FCC to amend the standard to
provide clearer guidance in this crucial sector.

